Negative Brief: China Export Controls - Good

Negative Brief: China Export Controls - Good 2

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY 2

OPENING QUOTE 2

US troops staring down the barrel of Chinese weapons marked “made in America” 2

INHERENCY 2

Reforms already underway 2

Status Quo export control reforms are working, creating new jobs 3

New export control reforms are on the right track: producing good initial results 3

We need to wait another year to effectively judge current reforms – but they’re moving in the right direction. Let’s hold off on this Affirmative plan and wait one more year before we decide… 3

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE 4

Maybe they did in the ‘90s, but today US export controls don’t have much impact on US hi-tech exports 4

Maximum 1.1% impact. Total loss of all US hi-tech exports (not just China) from export controls is no more than 1.1% 4

Lost exports to China problem went away over the last 20 years – they’re doing fine now 5

Zero hi-tech export impact from US export controls on trade specifically with China 6

US hi-tech export losses are minimal and then they make up the losses in other sectors 6

Export controls are not a burden on US industry 7

SOLVENCY 7

1. Not much benefit 7

US exporters wouldn’t benefit much – it’s mostly European and Japanese exporters who are blocked 7

2. More Study Needed 8

We don’t have enough data about the impacts of Western technology exports to China 8

DISADVANTAGES 8

Link & Uniqueness to all NEG Disads 8

China can't get military technology elsewhere: If they could, they wouldn't complain about US export controls 8

1. Military technology leakage 8

Link: Export controls are effective at denying technology to high-risk countries 8

Link + Uniqueness: China can't get military technology elsewhere. See General Link card above. 9

Link: Chinese are trying to get controlled US technology for military applications 9

Link: China wants technology to be able to confront and defeat America's best weaponry in battle over Taiwan 9

Link: Chinese military development poses a major threat to Taiwan 9

Link: Growing Chinese military capability increases likelihood of PRC/Taiwan war superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention. 10

Impact: Taiwan war would be economic and political disaster for PRC and US 10

2. Satellite technology leakage 11

Link: China is actively seeking to steal satellite technology from the US 11

Link: China intends to develop satellite technology to use against the US 11

Impact: Foundation of America's military strength is at serious risk 11

Impact: Big threats to US naval ships 12

Impact: Space capabilities could be critical to outcome of a limited war with China 12

Negative Brief: China Export Controls - Good

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

If export controls are ineffective because the technology is available everywhere, why is China working so hard to defeat US export controls? They should just go buy it off the shelf at Radio Shack in London or Tokyo -- no need to take the risks of illegal activity. China's efforts at diplomacy to get the controls lifted and their illegal activities to get the technology in circumvention of the controls indicate they don't believe that the technology they want is generally available on the open market. Therefore, export controls must be of some value in effectively denying critical technologies to China.

OPENING QUOTE

US troops staring down the barrel of Chinese weapons marked “made in America”

 Simon Cooper 2009 (journalist), 9 July 2009, How China Steals U.S. Military Secrets POPULAR MECHANICS, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a746/3319656/> (brackets added)

Meanwhile, says the IASC's [International Assessment & Strategy Center] Richard Fisher, a "battle is being waged. The Chinese have established a vast collection system that by the end of the decade will have helped them to become a global military power." While concern grows among policy-makers and wonks, [US Customs Agent Anthony] Mangione and his team still labor in the shadows of the worldwide arms bazaar. They hope to prevent the day when U.S. troops could find themselves staring down the barrel of a high-tech weapon marked "Made in America."

INHERENCY

Reforms already underway

Prof. [J. David Richardson](http://www.piie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=57) & Dr. Asha Sundaram 2013. (Richardson -  professor of economics in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and Public Affairs at Syracuse University; senior fellow (retired) at Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sundaram - Asst Professor at The School of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Univ of Cape Town, South Africa; PhD in Economics from Syracuse Univ.) Sizing Up US Export Disincentives for a New Generation of National-Security Export Controls May 2013 PDF downloaded from <http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2408> (brackets added)

[Defense] Secretary [Robert] Gates proceeded to initiate a four-part reform process to design, ideally and ultimately, a single export control list, a single licensing agency, a single enforcement coordination agency, and a single information-technology system. Though progress to date has been slow, especially on single-agency consolidation, the proposed reforms have moved ahead. Unifying definitions and electronic record-keeping systems are well-advanced by early 2013, under an Automated Export System (AES).

Status Quo export control reforms are working, creating new jobs

**Brandt Pasco 2014 (**attorney at Kaye Scholer LLP; was a member of the National Security Council’s Task Force on Export Control Reform from 2009 – 2011, and is an author of ongoing export control reforms.  Previously he worked on foreign policy and defense-related issues in the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Republican National Committee, and the U.S. Congress) 19 Oct 2014 [The Case for Export Control Reform, and What it Means for America](http://harvardnsj.org/2014/10/the-case-for-export-control-reform-and-what-it-means-for-america/),, Harvard Law School NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL <http://harvardnsj.org/2014/10/the-case-for-export-control-reform-and-what-it-means-for-america/>

In the long term, the unfolding reforms will strengthen national security and the economy by establishing precisely defined and consistently applied controls on goods and services that raise national security concerns.  While national security was the sole motivating factor behind export control reform, it cannot be denied that providing legal clarity about what is subject to control will also lift a huge burden from industry. This brings us back to the Company, which was trying to innovate in an environment that punished innovation through unpredictable regulation based upon non-public standards.  Yes, these reforms are intended to maximize national security in ways most of the public will never directly experience, but they will also have a very tangible impact on millions of Americans. So, what does export control reform mean for everyday Americans?  In a word, “Jobs.”

New export control reforms are on the right track: producing good initial results

Gary Lerude 2015. (journalist) 13 May 2015 Early Returns: U.S. Export Control Reform Positive MICROWAVE JOURNAL <http://www.microwavejournal.com/articles/24225> (brackets added)

Kevin Wolf is the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration (see Figure 3). He joined the Obama administration after spending 17 years with a Washington law firm  that focused on export cases. Sworn in two months before Robert Gates spoke at the BENS conference, Wolf became the regulator and the export control reform champion at BIS.?As he has done dozens of times since 2010, Wolf rattles off the list of benefits spawned by export reform. “Commerce allows license exceptions,” he begins, the biggest being provisions associated with the 36 strategic trade authorization (STA) countries. These include replacement parts, limited value shipments and temporary exports. Unlike ITAR, the EAR has a de minimis provision that allows exports where the value of the product is less than 25 percent of the total value of the end equipment, so long as the ultimate end use is not in an embargoed country. BIS [Bureau of Industry and Security] doesn’t require separate licenses for manufacturing, technical assistance agreements or proposals. Congressional reporting, registration and import are all simpler, and BIS doesn’t charge for licenses. He concludes that Commerce is very flexible, meaning they can tailor licenses, and adds “we have very friendly licensing officers.” Although it’s early in the process, Wolf is pleased with the initial results. DDTC [Directorate of Defense Trade Controls ] is seeing a significant reduction in license applications and CJs [Commodity Jurisdictions], “especially for lower-level items.”

We need to wait another year to effectively judge current reforms – but they’re moving in the right direction. Let’s hold off on this Affirmative plan and wait one more year before we decide…

Gary Lerude 2015. (journalist) 13 May 2015 Early Returns: U.S. Export Control Reform Positive MICROWAVE JOURNAL <http://www.microwavejournal.com/articles/24225> (brackets added)

Everyone agrees that it’s too early to judge the success of the changes, despite the initial positive signs. In another year companies and government regulators will have considerable experience to judge what is working well, where the bottlenecks lie and further changes that are warranted. [Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration]Kevin Wolf says the government’s mantra with export control reform has been “flexibility, adaptability and transparency,” and he encourages industry to communicate with the agencies. Speaking at the annual BIS export conference held in July 2014, Wolf reflected on the progress since the administration committed to export reform. “This is all moving us closer to one of my personal goals for the limited time I have in government, which is that the export control agencies think of themselves as part of one system, one administration, bound by the rules, but willing and able to change those rules in a transparent, regularized process as foreign policy and national security considerations change, and as technology evolves.”

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

Maybe they did in the ‘90s, but today US export controls don’t have much impact on US hi-tech exports

Prof. [J. David Richardson](http://www.piie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=57) & Dr. Asha Sundaram 2013. (Richardson -  professor of economics in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and Public Affairs at Syracuse University; senior fellow (retired) at Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sundaram - Asst Professor at The School of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Univ of Cape Town, South Africa; PhD in Economics from Syracuse Univ.) Sizing Up US Export Disincentives for a New Generation of National-Security Export Controls May 2013 <http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2408>

In the early 1990s, US export controls that aimed to keep high-tech goods and technologies out of the hands of enemies deterred from $15 billion to $25 billion of such exports. Recent US export controls seem to deter US high-tech exports considerably less. As percentages of seven broad industrial categories of high-tech exports, estimated American export shortfalls from national security controls have fallen from roughly 5 percent in the early 1990s to slightly over 1 percent in the mid-to-late 2000s. Ongoing reform of American national-security export controls would seem to have only modest effects on the level of US high-tech exports. American exporters seem to have developed a distinctive competitive ability to shift their sales efforts flexibly among customers and products that are subject to tight, loose, and few controls.

Maximum 1.1% impact. Total loss of all US hi-tech exports (not just China) from export controls is no more than 1.1%


**This is based on a study from economists who thought the losses were much higher and were trying to prove it, but then they found out there really wasn’t much loss after all.**

Prof. [J. David Richardson](http://www.piie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=57) & Dr. Asha Sundaram 2013. (Richardson -  professor of economics in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and Public Affairs at Syracuse University; senior fellow (retired) at Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sundaram - Asst Professor at The School of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Univ of Cape Town, South Africa; PhD in Economics from Syracuse Univ.) Sizing Up US Export Disincentives for a New Generation of National-Security Export Controls May 2013 <http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2408>

Our initial suspicion for this study was that recent apoplectic expert assessments of US export controls, described in the next section, almost surely suggested high *quantitative* estimates representing foregone exports, much higher than 20 years ago. In this updated research, however, that suspicion has *not* been confirmed—though foregone exports are still present, quantitatively. We estimate that lost American high-tech exports attributable to export controls6 are in the neighborhood of $1.7 billion to $6.6 billion per year—negligible to 1.1 percent of measured high-tech exports.

Lost exports to China problem went away over the last 20 years – they’re doing fine now

Prof. [J. David Richardson](http://www.piie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=57) & Dr. Asha Sundaram 2013. (Richardson -  professor of economics in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and Public Affairs at Syracuse University; senior fellow (retired) at Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sundaram - Asst Professor at The School of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Univ of Cape Town, South Africa; PhD in Economics from Syracuse Univ.) Sizing Up US Export Disincentives for a New Generation of National-Security Export Controls May 2013 PDF downloaded from <http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2408>




Zero hi-tech export impact from US export controls on trade specifically with China

Prof. [J. David Richardson](http://www.piie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=57) & Dr. Asha Sundaram 2013. (Richardson -  professor of economics in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and Public Affairs at Syracuse University; senior fellow (retired) at Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sundaram - Asst Professor at The School of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Univ of Cape Town, South Africa; PhD in Economics from Syracuse Univ.) Sizing Up US Export Disincentives for a New Generation of National-Security Export Controls May 2013 PDF downloaded from <http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2408>



US hi-tech export losses are minimal and then they make up the losses in other sectors

Prof. [J. David Richardson](http://www.piie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=57) & Dr. Asha Sundaram 2013. (Richardson -  professor of economics in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and Public Affairs at Syracuse University; senior fellow (retired) at Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sundaram - Asst Professor at The School of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Univ of Cape Town, South Africa; PhD in Economics from Syracuse Univ.) Sizing Up US Export Disincentives for a New Generation of National-Security Export Controls May 2013 PDF downloaded from <http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2408>



Export controls are not a burden on US industry

Arthur Shulman 2009. (General Counsel, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control) Hearing on the Export Administration Act: A Review of Outstanding Policy Considerations, testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, July 9, 2009) <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/testimonyonexportadministrationact-070909.htm>

Are dual-use export controls a burden on U.S. industry? The facts speak for themselves. An analysis by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) showed that in 2005, 99.81 percent of exports subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) left the United States without an export license, including 98.5 percent of items on the Commerce Control List. And even for the tiny fraction of dual-use trade that required an export license, the Commerce Department denied only 1.4 percent of the license applications it processed during that period (FY2005), while lowering processing times. Two years later, denials were at 0.88 percent. One almost wonders, what’s left for industry to complain about?

SOLVENCY

1. Not much benefit

US exporters wouldn’t benefit much – it’s mostly European and Japanese exporters who are blocked

Prof. [J. David Richardson](http://www.piie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=57) & Dr. Asha Sundaram 2013. (Richardson -  professor of economics in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and Public Affairs at Syracuse University; senior fellow (retired) at Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sundaram - Asst Professor at The School of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Univ of Cape Town, South Africa; PhD in Economics from Syracuse Univ.) Sizing Up US Export Disincentives for a New Generation of National-Security Export Controls May 2013 PDF downloaded from <http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2408>



2. More Study Needed

We don’t have enough data about the impacts of Western technology exports to China

Oliver Brauner, Mark Bromley and Dr. Mathieu Duchatel 2015. (Brauner – researcher with Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Bromley - Co-Director of the *SIPRI* Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme Duchatel - PhD; Senior Researcher and Head China representative at SIPRI. ) STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESERCH INSTITUTE, Jan 2015 Western Arms Exports to China SIPRI Policy Paper No. 43 <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP43.pdf>

Making an accurate assessment of the impact of Western transfers of military-relevant technologies on the development of the Chinese military is hampered by the lack of available data. Both exporting states and companies could release relevant data to allow for an accurate assessment of the impact of Western supplies. States should further increase the amount of public information about export licences approvals and denials and actual arms exports to China and other sensitive destinations via both the EU Annual Report and national reports on arms exports. At a minimum, states should provide descriptions of goods licensed for export and goods actually exported, as well as the number of items involved and a description of the end user. Companies should release information about the current status of deals signed prior to 1989, including whether they are aware of any ongoing production in China and whether issues relating to intellectual property theft have been raised with the Chinese Government or industry.

DISADVANTAGES

Link & Uniqueness to all NEG Disads

China can't get military technology elsewhere: If they could, they wouldn't complain about US export controls


William R. Hawkins 2010 (consultant specializing in international economic and national security issues. He is a former economics professor and Republican Congressional staff member) 3 May 2010, Exclusive: Desperate to Trade with the Enemy?  <http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.6120/pub_detail.asp> (brackets added)

His [Dan Griswold's] argument to his American audience is misleading. If China could get comparable “dual use” technology elsewhere, their officials would not be placing such a high priority on ending U.S. export controls. Their officials raise this issue in every meeting. Beijing knows that America leads the world in military technology and they want to get their hands on it, by hook or by crook.

1. Military technology leakage

Link: Export controls are effective at denying technology to high-risk countries

Prof. [J. David Richardson](http://www.piie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=57) & Dr. Asha Sundaram 2013. (Richardson -  professor of economics in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and Public Affairs at Syracuse University; senior fellow (retired) at Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sundaram - Asst Professor at The School of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Univ of Cape Town, South Africa; PhD in Economics from Syracuse Univ.) Sizing Up US Export Disincentives for a New Generation of National-Security Export Controls May 2013 PDF downloaded from <http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2408>



Link + Uniqueness: China can't get military technology elsewhere. See General Link card above.

Link: Chinese are trying to get controlled US technology for military applications

William R. Hawkins 2010 (consultant specializing in international economic and national security issues. He is a former economics professor and Republican Congressional staff member) 3 May 2010, Exclusive: Desperate to Trade with the Enemy?  <http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.6120/pub_detail.asp> (brackets added)

Michelle Van Cleave, who coordinated the hunt for foreign spies for the Director of National Intelligence from 2003 to 2006, told CBS’s “60 Minutes” last February, "Virtually every technology that is on the U.S. control technology list has been targeted at one time or another by the Chinese. Sensors, and optics, and biological and chemical processes. These are the things, information technologies across all the things that we have identified as having inherent military application."

Link: China wants technology to be able to confront and defeat America's best weaponry in battle over Taiwan

 Simon Cooper 2009 (journalist), 9 July 2009, How China Steals U.S. Military Secrets POPULAR MECHANICS, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a746/3319656/>

"The Chinese watched with dismay the ease of the U.S. victory over Iraq," says Toshi Yoshihara, visiting professor at the Air War College in Montgomery, Ala. In response, he says, modernizing the country's vast but primitive arsenal became a top priority for Chinese officials. According to U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense Richard Lawless, China's sense of urgency stems partly from concern over the future of Taiwan. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Lawless said that China wants "a variety of credible military options to deter moves by Taiwan toward permanent separation or, if required, to compel by force the integration of Taiwan" with the mainland. Since the United States has pledged to defend Taiwan, that means China is seeking the ability to go toe-to-toe against America's best weaponry. Some U.S. officials argue that China's ambitions go beyond Taiwan to encompass the global stage. Rather than trying to address all its military shortcomings at once, Yoshihara says, the Chinese government focused on obtaining "leap ahead" technologies already in use by the United States. Former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin called these technologies "shashoujian," translated variously as "assassin's mace" or "silver bullet." They ranged from advanced communications equipment to long-range missile systems.

Link: Chinese military development poses a major threat to Taiwan

US Dept of Defense 2013. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (first brackets added, second brackets, quotations, and ellipses in original) [https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress\_djvu.txt](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress_djvu.txt&sa=D&ust=1443092828049000&usg=AFQjCNFgdrBMjMrn5D_pFM2e5X0i5Ca10A" \t "_blank)

Alongside positive public statements about the Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders in China following the re-election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, however, there have been no signs that China’s military disposition opposite Taiwan has changed significantly. The PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

Link: Growing Chinese military capability increases likelihood of PRC/Taiwan war superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

Randall Schriver 2008 (founding partner of Armitage International LLC, a consulting firm that specializes in international business development and strategies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; masters degree in public policy from Harvard) 26 Mar 2008 "U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan" <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Schriver.pdf>

While all of the factors above are troubling, the greatest concern is the growing military capabilities of China, and the resulting gap in capabilities between China and Taiwan. This should give policy makers the most worry because intentions can shift very, very quickly (it’s the capabilities that require a great deal of time to develop), and the option to use force becomes more and more attractive when the military equation reaches a great imbalance.

Impact: Taiwan war would be economic and political disaster for PRC and US

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter 2004 ( PhD in Diplomatic History; vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international issues) 10 Aug 2004, "China's Taiwan Policy and America's Difficult Choices" <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2778>

And a war in the Taiwan strait would be a disaster for both the PRC and the United States. The mutually beneficial economic relationship (now valued at more than $150 billion a year) would be severed, and America's relations with a major power would be poisoned for decades.

2. Satellite technology leakage

Link: China is actively seeking to steal satellite technology from the US

US Dept of Defense 2013. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (first brackets added, second brackets, quotations, and ellipses in original) [https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress\_djvu.txt](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress_djvu.txt&sa=D&ust=1443092828051000&usg=AFQjCNHf87lMILBqcIWhg1HMm-pePvZxbA" \t "_blank)

In September 2010, Xian Hongwei and Li Li were arrested in Hungary and later extradited to the United States for conspiring to procure thousands of radiation-hardened Programmable Read-Only Microchips, classified as defense items and used in satellite systems, for the China Aerospace and Technology Corporation. Both defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced in September 2011 to two years in prison.

Link: China intends to develop satellite technology to use against the US

US Dept of Defense 2013. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (first brackets added, second brackets, quotations, and ellipses in original) [https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress\_djvu.txt](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress_djvu.txt&sa=D&ust=1443092828051000&usg=AFQjCNHf87lMILBqcIWhg1HMm-pePvZxbA" \t "_blank)

A PLA [People’s Liberation Army] analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations reinforced the importance of operations in space to enable “informatized” warfare, claiming that “space is the commanding point for the information battlefield.” PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance...and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.” The same PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations also states that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors…will deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.”

Impact: Foundation of America's military strength is at serious risk

 Dr. Ashley J. Tellis 2008 (senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. Former senior adviser to the U.S. Dept of State Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India) , Oct 2008, "China's Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests," <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22595>

While it is no doubt easier to assess the impact of any specific element in China’s counterspace quiver on U.S. military operations, it is much harder to evaluate the compound effect of all (or some of) these systems when employed synergistically. In any event, a summary judgment about China’s counterspace programs ought to suggest, as has been argued elsewhere, "that the U.S. dominance of space, which underwrites both America’s civilian and military advantages, and which is often taken for granted, is at serious risk like never before" for reasons that are unique to Sino-American competition.

Impact: Big threats to US naval ships

 Dr. Ashley J. Tellis 2008 (senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. Former senior adviser to the U.S. Dept of State Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India) , Oct 2008, "China's Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests," <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22595>

First, China’s space and counterspace programs presage an increase in the vulnerability of key U.S. military assets. The emergence of new Chinese long-range precision attack capabilities, exemplified by highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles exploiting information derived from various sensors including spacebased assets, has already sharpened the dangers facing fixed U.S. and allied bases in the Asia-Pacific. As China’s anti-ship ballistic missile capability matures something that is certain to occur in the policy-relevant future – the threats posed to mobile power projection assets, especially aircraft carriers, which have been the capital ship symbolizing the reach and puissance of American power since at least World War II, would increase dramatically. China’s emerging space capabilities will be critical to the success of this area denial innovation: today, Chinese satellites can be used mainly to localize and classify its intended targets, but as time goes by, Beijing’s space assets would become critical to the entire detection-to-engagement kill chain with significant operational consequences.

Impact: Space capabilities could be critical to outcome of a limited war with China

 Dr. Ashley J. Tellis 2008 (senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. Former senior adviser to the U.S. Dept of State Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India) , Oct 2008, "China's Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests," <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22595>

Assuring victory in a limited war with China, however, becomes more problematic not because the United States suddenly loses all its military advantages in such a scenario but because a limited conflict, over Taiwan or elsewhere, would involve restrictive rules of engagement and other political-operational constraints which, even if not ultimately subversive of victory, would nonetheless increase its burdens. Because most future conflicts that can be envisaged with China involve limited wars of some kind or another, Beijing’s increasing space and counterspace capabilities – if well used – could become critical, if not decisive, in some quite representative scenarios.